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Iowa's Civil Rights Act' forbids discrimination on the basis of race,
creed, color, sex, national origin, religion, disability, and age in employ-
ment, accommodations and services, housing, education, and credit. The
Iowa act is similar to hundreds of civil rights acts at the national, state,
and municipal levels. Like the vast majority of these jurisdictions, Iowa
does not protect "sexual preference or orientation," but, like every juris-
diction within earshot of an ACLU chapter, Iowa is being spurred to ex-
pand its civil rights act to encompass "sexual minorities." Last year Iowa
nearly acceded.
On March 29, 1989, the Iowa House of Representatives passed a bill
that would have outlawed discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion, but because the State Senate did not act, the bill died at the end of
the session. The matter has been postponed, but it has not gone away.
Homosexual activists and their allies within what is now commonly called
the civil rights community are well organized and determined, and they
will continue to demand their "rights" until they either prevail or are
decisively turned away. If they prevail, there will be losers, including
those churches and congregations that cling to the Bible and traditional
morality in lieu of the "progressive" and intellectually fashionable idea2
*Mr. Oliphant is a lawyer working in the United States Senate. He received his law degree
from the University of Utah.
Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 601A (West 1988).
C.S. Lewis once cautioned against the "fashionable outcry" that warns "each generation
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that homosexuality and bisexuality are mere "preferences," like bow ties
and argyle socks, or morally insignificant "orientations," like being left-
handed.
Many members of the civil rights community are loathe to speak of
winners and losers. They figure that if "sexual preference" wins, then ev-
eryone wins; there will be no losers-with the possible exception of that
new-sprung yet malevolent creature, the "homophobe." Unfortunately,
the evidence does not point to that blissful future. It points instead to a
future where religious morality will shrivel and religious liberty will
shrink because of state trepasses against the churches.3
I. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND "SEXUAL ORIENTATION" IN IOWA
The "sexual orientation bill," as originally introduced in the Iowa
House, would have accomplished two objectives. First, it would have
added "sexual orientation" to the current list of categories for which dis-
crimination is forbidden in employment, education, housing, and the like.
Second, it would have defined the term "sexual orientation" to include
"heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality" but not "participation in
acts which are prohibited by law." On the House floor, the bill was
amended (by a one-vote margin) to create a statutory exemption for reli-
gious organizations. Then, on March 29, 1989, by a vote of 57-to-41, the
Iowa House of Representatives passed the "sexual orientation bill"
("Bill").4 The Bill did not move through a Senate committee in a timely
manner and was not, therefore, cleared for Senate floor action in 1989.
A. The Statute
1. Iowa's Prohibition on Discrimination in Employment and the Religious
Exemption
against those vices of which it is least in danger." "Cruel ages are put on their guard against
Sentimentality, feckless and idle ones against Respectability, lecherous ones against Puri-
tanism; and whenever all men are really hastening to be slaves and tyrants we make Liber-
alism the prime bogey." C.S. LEwis, THE SCREWTAPE LETTERS 117-18 (1975).
3 Throughout this article I refer to "church" or "churches" for the sake of simplicity, but
the argument applies with equal force to synagogues, temples, mosques, and other religious
congregations and activities. It must be remembered also that the amended statute will
cover individuals and non-religious organizations and that bona fide religious disputes will
arise in these other contexts, as well. For example, when a homosexual couple tries to rent a
private apartment and the landlord objects to a lease on religious grounds, who will prevail?
This precise problem is arising (with respect to unmarried heterosexuals who are living to-
gether) in states where the law forbids discrimination based on "marital status." See Reli-
gious Rights of Tenants, Landlords in Dispute, V RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ALERT 1 (March
1989).
' H.F. 351, 73d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1989). "H.F." stands for House File.
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The Iowa Civil Rights Act is to "be construed broadly to effectuate
its purposes, ' and the Bill would have added "sexual orientation" to the
current list of categories for which discrimination is forbidden. In the im-
portant area of employment decisions, for example, it would have added
the term "sexual orientation" to section 601A.6(1) of the Iowa Code as
follows:
1. It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any:
a. Person to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for employ-
ment, to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employ-
ment against any applicant for employment or any employee because of the
age, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, religion, or
disability of such applicant or employee, unless based upon the nature of
the occupation.'
Iowa's prohibition against discrimination in employment does not ap-
ply to certain kinds of religious employment. Subsection 601A.6(6), the
religious exemption paragraph, provides in pertinent part:
6. This section shall not apply to:
d. Any bona fide religious institution or its educational facility, associa-
tion, corporation or society with respect to any qualifications for employ-
ment based on religion when such qualifications are related to a bona fide
religious purpose. A religious qualification for instructional personnel or an
administrative officer, serving in a supervisory capacity of a bona fide reli-
gious educational facility or religious institution, shall be presumed to be a
bona fide occupational qualification.7
In 1978, before the General Assembly added the presumption in the
second sentence of paragraph 601A.6(6)(d), the Iowa Attorney General
construed the first sentence of that paragraph8 as follows:
Under the Iowa Civil Rights Act, a religious institution may not discrimi-
nate based on religion in the hiring of all of its employees. Rather, a reli-
gious institution in Iowa may use religion as an employment criteria only
where qualifications for a position "are related to a bona fide religious pur-
pose" of such religious institution. Thus, in filling positions which relate to
the institution's religious purpose, a church may choose its employees on
the basis of religion. Therefore, the religious discrimination provisions of
' IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.18 (West 1988).
SH.F. 351, 73d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1989).
7 IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6(6)(d) (West 1988).
8 I suspect the second sentence was added in response to the Attorney General's opinion.
The opinion was issued on February 23, 1978, and the second sentence was added by 1978
Iowa Acts, ch. 1179, effective Jan. 1, 1979.
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601A.6(1) never apply to employees holding church offices, conducting reli-
gious services or ceremonies, doing church oriented counseling, translating
scriptures, or performing similar religion connected employment activities.
. . .[O]n the other hand, [the religious exemption paragraph] does not
serve to allow a religious institution to use religion as an employment crite-
ria for positions involving work of a secular, as opposed to a religious, na-
ture. Thus, it would appear to be illegal for a religious institution in Iowa to
consider religion in hiring someone for a position of custodian or account-
ant. Similarly, it would not be legal for a religious institution to consider
religion in employing someone to operate the church's physical plants, or to
serve as an administrator of church run programs or businesses, unless the
position in question involved duties related to the spiritual mission of the
institution or its Free Exercise of religion.
[The question is] whether a religious institution may consider the
"moral character" of an applicant for employment in deciding whether to
hire that individual. The answer is that it is legal, under the Iowa Civil
Rights Act, for a religious institution to consider the "moral character" of
an individual in making employment decisions. In employment not related
to a religious purpose, however, religion may not serve as an employment
criteria. Therefore, when applying a criteria [sic] of "moral character" to
employment not related to a religious purpose, the institution must apply
standards of good moral character accepted by society in general, not a the-
ological or doctrinal standard.
It is appropriate, in closing, to interject a word concerning the prohibi-
tions of discrimination, besides religious discrimination, which are con-
tained in 601A.6(1). [The religious exemption paragraph] specifies that
when "related to a bona fide religious purpose," the provisions of 601A.6(1)
shall not apply "with respect to any qualifications for employment based
on religion." This means that the provisions of 601A.6(1) relating to age,
race, color, sex, national origin and disability, generally apply to all employ-
ment by a religious institution. [The paragraph] does not relieve a religious
employer from its obligation not to discriminate, unless a religious doctrine
or teaching requires disparate treatment of one of the protected classes.
601A.6(1)'s prohibitions of discrimination based on age, race, color, sex, na-
tional origin or disability are applicable to employment by religious institu-
tions, even religion oriented employment, unless a religious reason justifies
exclusion of persons of a particular age, race, sex, national origin or disabil-
ity from the particular job.'
9 1977-78 Op. Att'y Gen. Iowa 436. At the time the Iowa opinion was written, the Attorney
General reasonably believed that a broader interpretation of § 601A.6 might be unconstitu-
tional. That belief has since proven erroneous. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (unanimous court). Amos taught that a similar but broader fed-
eral act is not an unconstitutional establishment of religion. The holding in Amos does not
affect the validity of the Iowa Attorney General's opinion.
Generally, Amos is regarded as a victory for religious liberty. One commentator, how-
ever, is not convinced:
Amos lost, but it is hard to conclude that religion won .... For one thing, Amos
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If the Bill is enacted, religious institutions will be prohibited from
discriminating with respect to a person's sexual orientation, and the last
sentence of the Attorney General's opinion (quoted immediately above)
would have to be amended to read: "601A.6(1)'s prohibition[] of discrimi-
nation based on ... sexual orientation ... [is] applicable to employment
by religious institutions, even religion oriented employment, unless a reli-
gious reason justifies exclusion of persons of a particular. . . sexual orien-
tation . ..."
To take a concrete example from the Iowa Attorney General's opin-
ion, the Bill would prohibit a church from insisting that its custodians
and accountants be heterosexuals. 0
But will the religious exemption added on the floor of the Iowa
House change this result? The House floor amendment amended para-
graph 601A.6(6)(d) as follows:
6. This section shall not apply to:
d. Any bona fide religious institution or its educational facility, associa-
tion, corporation or society with respect to any qualification for employment
based on religion or sexual orientation when such qualifications are related
to a bona fide religious purpose ... 
This amendment, which passed by one vote, 2 may not provide any
additional protection to a religious institution because for a religious or-
ganization that regards homosexuality, bisexuality, and heterosexuality as
important moral issues a "qualification based on sexual orientation" is a
"qualification based on religion." In other words, the current lan-
guage-"any qualification for employment based on religion when such
qualification[] [is] related to a bona fide religious purpose"-may already
established no defense whatsoever to a hostile takeover of the field by statute, and
thus articulated no constitutional doctrine of "church autonomy." The majority opin-
ion does seem to contemplate some constitutionally mandated... "noninterference"
in religious practices, but neither in Amos nor in any other case has the Court
squarely held that religious organizations possess constitutional rights.
What is truly remarkable about the Amos case is that there is an Amos case at
all. How did we arrive at a point where Congress may (or may not) "grant" church
autonomy, and where a court seriously considers whether Congress "establishes" reli-
gion if it does?
Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church and State?, 49
LA. L. REV. 1057, 1066-67 (1989).
"0 See 1977-78 Op. Att'y Reg. Iowa 436, 438.
" H.F. 351, 73d Gen. Assembly, Gen. Sess. (1989) (emphasis supplied).
12 The following amendment failed: "This section [prohibiting unfair employment practices]
shall not apply to ... any educational institution if a student or a student's parent objects
to employment of administrative or instructional staff, based upon homosexuality or
bisexuality."
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include a qualification based on "sexual orientation." If this interpreta-
tion is correct, then the Iowa Attorney General's reasoning remains sound
and, even after enactment of the Bill, a religious organization would have
to demonstrate "a bona fide religious purpose" for excluding a homosex-
ual from a position. To reiterate the Attorney General's position:
In employment not related to a religious purpose, however, religion [or, af-
ter enactment of the Bill, sexual orientation] may not serve as an employ-
ment criteria. Therefore, when applying a criteria of "moral character" to
employment not related to a religious purpose, the institution must apply
standards of good moral character accepted by society in general, not a the-
ological or doctrinal standard.13
I reject the alternative way of interpreting the amendment because it
requires one to believe that, without the House floor amendment, the
Iowa Civil Rights Act would have meant that a religious institution could
impose a religious qualification but not a sexual orientation qualification,
i.e., that a Catholic institution could restrict certain positions to persons
of the Catholic faith but could not differentiate between a homosexual
Catholic and a heterosexual Catholic for bona fide religious purposes. I
think (and hope) the Act allows more than a mere denominational prefer-
ence. I interpret the Act to mean that a Catholic institution can require
an employee to be a Catholic and a good Catholic.
Regardless of the meaning of the present act, however, the House
floor amendment is important and will have the beneficial effect of elimi-
nating or minimizing, at least, arguments over whether a qualification
based on sexual orientation is based on religion. Of course, whether a
qualification is "based on religion" or "based on sexual orientation" Iowa
law requires that it be "related to a bona fide religious purpose."
2. Iowa's Prohibition on Discrimination in Education and the Religious
Exemption
With respect to education, which is of abiding concern to many reli-
gious institutions, section 601A.9 of the Iowa Code reaches all educational
programs and activities. This section now reads in pertinent part: "It is
an unfair or discriminatory practice for any educational institution to dis-
criminate on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion or
disability in any program or activity ... ."" The Bill would insert "sexual
orientation" after "sex" and thereby forbid educational institutions to
have practices that "discriminate on the basis of .. . sexual orienta-
tion .. . in any program or activity."
Iowa also recognizes a religious exemption for educational institu-
" 1977-78 Op. Att'y Gen. Iowa 436, 439.
" IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.9 (West 1988).
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tions. Section 601A.9 provides an exception for religious schools that is
not limited to employment but is otherwise identical to the general ex-
emption for employers.15 Therefore, because the operative language in the
two cases is identical, the Attorney General's analysis of Iowa's statutory
exemption for bona fide religious employment presumedly applies with
equal force to educational institutions.
The House floor amendment to the Bill changed the religious school
exception of section 601A.9 as follows: "Nothing in this section shall be
construed as prohibiting any bona fide religious institution from imposing
qualifications based on religion or sexual orientation when such qualifica-
tions are related to a bona fide religious purpose."'"
To summarize,1 7 the religious exemption in section 601A.6(6)(d) is
limited to employment"8 and the religious exemption in section 601A.9,
second unnumbered paragraph is limited to the programs and activities
of educational institutions.
In order for a religious institution to be exempt in its employment or
educational activities all three of the following requirements must be
met: First, the organization itself must be a "bona fide religious institu-
tion"; second, the institution's qualification must be "based on religion or
sexual orientation" (sexual orientation being added by the House floor
amendment); third, the qualifications must be "related to a bona fide reli-
gious purpose."19
B. Interpreting the Statute
1. The First Prong: What Is a "Bona Fide Religious Institution"?-The
Christian Science Monitor Case
Is Id.
H.F. 351, 73d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1989).
There are other exceptions to the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 that we are not specifi-
cally concerned with in this article. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.7(2)(a) (accommodations or
services); id. § 601A.12(1) (housing).
"s For recent developments in the law of private employment and the homosexual employee,
see, Douglas, I Sit and Look Out: Employment Discrimination Against Homosexuals and
the New Law of Unjust Dismissal, 33 WASH. U. J. URaB. & CONTEMP. L. 73 (1988) and Com-
ment, Challenging Sexual Preference Discrimination in Private Employment, 41 OHIo ST.
L.J. 501 (1980).
For a comprehensive survey of the law regarding sexual orientation, see Developments
in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1508 (1989), and Professor
Rivera's corpus: Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties - Part II,
11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275 (1986); Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-
Eighties - Part I, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459 (1985); Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual
Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311 (1980-81); Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The
Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
'9 See IowA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.6, 601A.9 (West 1988).
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To qualify for a religious exemption under the Iowa Civil Rights Act
an organization must be a "bona fide religious institution."2 Determining
what qualifies as a "bona fide religious institution" is not always easy and
may require a careful judicial weighing of religious and secular elements.
Madsen v. Erwin21 provides an example of such a determination.
In Madsen, the plaintiff was a reporter for the Christian Science
Monitor. When it was learned that Ms. Madsen was a homosexual, she
was told to "heal herself," and when she refused, she was fired.22
Ms. Madsen sued the Monitor, the First Church of Christ, Scientist,
and various individuals for "wrongful discharge, defamation, invasion of
privacy, intentional infliction of mental distress, sexual and affectional
preference discrimination, and breach of fiduciary responsibilities.""
None of the claims were based on a sexual orientation statute. The trial
court denied the Monitor's motion for summary judgment and the de-
fendants appealed.2' The state supreme court sustained the Monitor's
motion for summary judgment with respect to about one-half of Madsen's
claims but allowed her to amend her complaint and plead anew her other
claims. The court held that the Monitor was a religious activity of the
Christian Science Church. 25 That holding was specifically limited,
however:
Our conclusion on the status of the Monitor is, of course, strictly limited to
the case before us. It is clear that "[niot every enterprise cloaking itself in
the name of religion can claim the constitutional protection conferred by
that status[,]" [and] "not every endeavor that is affiliated, however tenu-
ously, with a recognized religious body may qualify as a religious activity of
that body and come within the scope of the protection from governmental
20 See id.
21 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (1985). A student author summarized the case as follows:
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that while a church's decision to fire a lay
employee who violated religious doctrine was beyond judicial scrutiny, tort claims
arising out of the dismissal proceeding could be regulated. Before Madsen, courts
could regulate a church's decision to discharge lay employees; however, the discharge
procedure was generally beyond judicial review. Therefore, the Madsen decision has
significantly altered chuch autonomy over its secular employees.
Note, Sex or Sin: Deference to Church Authority Over Secular Employee's Violation of
Religious Doctrine: Madsen v. Erwin, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 907, 908 (1986) (footnotes omitted);
see Note, Church Employment and the First Amendment: The Protected Employer and
the Vulnerable Employee, 51 Mo. L. REV. 911 (1986); Comment, Constitutional Law-Free
Exercise Clause Permits Church to Fire Homosexual Employee-Madsen v. Erwin, 20 SUF-
FOLK U.L. REV. 119 (1986).
2 Madsen, 395 Mass. at 721, 481 N.E.2d at 1168.
22 Id. at 716, 481 N.E.2d at 1161.
24 Id.
22 Id. at 719, 481 N.E.2d at 1164.
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involvement that is afforded by the First Amendment.""8
The plaintiffs position27 was adopted by a dissenting justice. Accord-
ing to this view, the status of the religiously affiliated institution coupled
with the nature of the employee's work "requires a judicial balancing of
the competing Church and State interests."" The dissent reasoned as
follows:
It is true, as the court says . . . that the First Amendment prohibits civil
courts from intervening in disputes concerning religious doctrine, discipline,
faith, or internal organization ... and that courts cannot question the verity
of religious doctrines or beliefs .... However, whether Madsen, a writer...
for a church-affiliated newspaper is entitled to continued employment de-
spite her nonconformity to the Church's beliefs, does not appear to be a
dispute about religious doctrine, discipline, faith, or internal organization,
within the decided cases .... While the beliefs and practices of a minister
are of critical importance to the church in which the minister functions,
making judicial involvement in decisions affecting a minister's tenure inap-
propriate, it is far from clear that the same is true with respect to a sports-
writer on the staff of a church-affiliated newspaper.2
If the Iowa Act is amended, each church-affiliated school, camp,
newspaper, and shelter will have to show, case by case, fact upon fact,
that it is a "bona fide religious institution" eligible for the statutory ex-
emption regarding sexual orientation. Administrative agencies and civil
courts will conclude in some cases that institutions which the church re-
gards as legitimately religious are not in fact "bona fide religious institu-
tions" for purposes of the statute. Such institutions then will be com-
pelled to change their policies with respect to sexul orientation.
2. The Second Prong, Part A: What is a "Qualification Based on Reli-
gion"?-The Father Buchanan Case
Under the Iowa Act, a bona fide religious institution may establish a
"qualification based on religion."' 0 The qualification must be based on
religion; it may not be based on whim, prejudice, or secular philosophy.
In the summer of 1974, St. Paul, Minnesota adopted an ordinance
prohibiting discrimination based on "affectional or sexual preference."
The ordinance was repealed by initiative in the spring of 1978"' but not
" Id. at 719, 481 N.E.2d at 1164 n. 2 (citations omitted).
17 Madsen was supported by amici Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Civil Liber-
ties Union of Massachusetts, and Lesbian Rights Project. Id. at 1161.
" Id. at 723, 481 N.E.2d at 1171.
"' Id. at 722, 481 N.E.2d at 1170. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
10 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.6, 601A.9 (West 1988).
" See St. Paul Citizens for Human Rights v. City Council of St. Paul, 289 N.W.2d 402, 404
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in time to save Father Buchanan from a lawsuit.2
Father Buchanan was the Pastor of the Church of the Holy Child-
hood, which operated a parochial school. Mr. Thomas J. Murphy applied
for a job teaching music at the school. He was offered the job, but asked
for a week to think it over. When Murphy called back to accept the job
he was told that the offer had been withdrawn. According to the stipu-
lated facts, "Father Buchanan had withdrawn the offer of employment
based upon information which he had received that Mr. Murphy was of a
homosexual nature . . . . [He] had no proof of any actual homosexual
practices on the part of Mr. Murphy.""3
Mr. Murphy went to the St. Paul Department of Human Rights and
alleged that he had been discriminated against in violation of the City's
human rights ordinance. Father Buchanan resisted the ensuing investiga-
tion and finally had to be subpoenaed to testify. After the investigation,
the City's Department of Human Rights sued Father Buchanan on behalf'
of Mr. Murphy. Father Buchanan prevailed on first amendment grounds.
The government attempted to show that Father Buchanan misunder-
stood Catholic doctrine.3 4 The Commission was attempting to show that
Father Buchanan was acting on personal belief, not religious doctrine,
and that his act was not, therefore, entitled to protection under the first
amendment. The court stated:
[The City] admits the sincere religious motivation for [Father Buchanan's]
act, but claims that the act was not in accord with the teaching of the
church in which he is ordained. Therefore [the City] argues, [Father
Buchanan] is not entitled to constitutional protection.
Citing theological treatises, [the City] argues in [its] brief that the mere
state of being a "homosexual" is a morally neutral condition, and that only
specific homosexual practices are contrary to Catholic moral teaching. In
this narrow respect [the City] appears to be correct.3
Father Buchanan had to rely on the court's balancing of values to
win, but a sexual orientation statute opens a religious institution to losing
(as demonstrated by the Georgetown case in part II) and the constitution
will not always stand in the way.
(Minn. 1979).
3" See Lewis ex rel. Murphy v. Buchanan, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 696 (D. Minn.
1979).
" Id. at 697.
31 One would not have thought that the St. Paul Human Rights Commission was competent
to catechize a priest on Catholic doctrine.
36 Buchanan, 21 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 698.
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3. The Second Prong, Part B: What is a "Qualification Based on Sexual
Orientation"?-The Watkins and Sommers Cases
If the Bill is enacted, "sexual orientation" will mean "heterosexual-
ity, homosexuality, or bisexuality, but not participation in acts which are
prohibited by law." Unlike the District of Columbia ordinance quoted in
part II, the Iowa bill does not specify whether the legislature intends the
term to mean preference, practice, or both, and unlike the Wisconsin defi-
nition, the Iowa Act does not define the term to include "having a history
of ... or being identified with" hetero-, homo-, or bisexuality.36
The Iowa definition is not free from ambiguity (what definition is?),
but in comparing the Iowa definition only to the District of Columbia's
and Wisconsin's, two questions seem particularly prominent. First, does
''sexual orientation" include both conduct and preference? A panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit elevated this dis-
tinction to constitutional significance in Watkins v. United States
Army, 37 where the court said:
In this opinion we use the term "sexual orientation" to refer to the orienta-
tion of an individual's sexual preference, not to his actual sexual conduct.
Individuals whose sexual orientation creates in them a desire for sexual re-
lationships with persons of the opposite sex have a heterosexual orientation.
Individuals whose sexual orientation creates in them a desire for sexual re-
lationships with persons of the same sex have a homosexual orientation.
In contrast, we use the term "homosexual conduct" and "homosexual
acts" to refer to sexual activity between two members of the same sex
whether their orientations are homosexual, heterosexual or bisexual.38
Second, does the Iowa definition include a lifestyle where there is a
nexus between the lifestyle and a sexual orientation? For example, the
Iowa Supreme Court has held that its Civil Rights Act's proscription of
sex discrimination does not protect transsexuals.3 9 Will the Bill change
that result? Will the Bill protect transvestites whose behaviour is, per-
haps, included within the undefined statutory terms "heterosexuality, ho-
mosexuality, or bisexuality"?
38 See Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(13)(m) (West 1988).
3 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). In
Watkins, the en banc court withdrew the opinion of the merits panel on the ground that the
case could be decided the same way on principles of equitable estoppel, thus avoiding a
constitutional determination. 875 F.2d at 711.
38 Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1330 n.1. Catholic doctrine also maintains a distinction between
homosexual "orientation" and homosexual "conduct." See Comment, Gay Rights Coalition
v. Georgetown University: Failure to Recognize a Catholic University's Religious Liberty,
32 CATH. LAW. 170, 175-78 (1988).
" See Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Iowa 1983).
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4. The Third Prong: What Does It Mean To Be "Related to a Bona Fide
Religious Purpose"?-The Presbyterian Organist Case
Any qualification imposed on a bona fide religious institution,
whether based on a religious or sexual orientation, must still be tied ("re-
lated") to a "bona fide religious purpose."4 In Walker v. First Presbyte-
rian Church,'41 the plaintiff, Kevin Walker, was hired as the organist for
the First Orthodox Presbyterian Church of San Francisco. When the pas-
tor learned that Mr. Walker was a homosexual he met with Walker and
exhorted him to repent. The organist replied that he did not feel the need
to repent, and Walker was fired.
Walker sued the church. He alleged a violation of various sections of
the San Francisco Police Code which made it unlawful for an employer to
discharge any individual "for a discriminatory reason wholly or partially
based on sexual orientation."' 2 Unlike the Iowa Bill, the San Francisco
code did not have an express exception for religious activities. The church
had to defend itself on constitutional grounds, which it did successfully.' 3
Walker's suit failed because he was the organist, and the court found
that in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church the organist is part of the
"worship team."" The court also gave weight to the church's judgment
that Walker was an unrepentant sinner.45
If a similar lawsuit were to arise in Iowa after enactment of the Bill,
the court would have to determine whether excluding a homosexual as an
organist constitutes a "bona fide religious purpose." If so, then the church
would have a statutory exemption; if not, the court would have to apply
the statute unless the church was able to assert successfully a constitu-
tional defense under the federal or state constitution.'"
Remember, the Iowa Attorney General opined that church custodi-
ans and accountants do work of "a secular, as opposed to a religious, na-
,o See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.6, 601A.9 (West 1988).
41 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 762 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980).
42 Id. at 764.
" Id. Unlike the court in Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Center v. Ge-
orgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987), the California court was unable to find a compelling
state interest to override the church's free exercise rights.
" Walker, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 763. The plaintiff denied that he was part of
the worship team, apparently taking the position that he was just a keyboard man. See id.
" Id. at 764.
" Some of the general constitutional issues are discussed in Lupu, Free Exercise Exemp-
tion and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REv.
391 (1987); Marshall & Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establish-
ment Clause, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 293 (1986); Young & Tigges, Into the Religious
Thicket-Constitutional Limits on Civil Court Jurisdiction Over Ecclesiastical Disputes,
47 OHIO ST. L.J. 475 (1986); and Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation;
Homosexuality As a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985).
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ture. 4 7 If the Bill is adopted, lawyers will argue that playing the organ is
just like being an accountant: you sit down, you move your fingers, and
when you are finished you put on your coat and hat and go home. There
is not, they will say, a Presbyterian or Catholic or Jewish way of playing
the organ just as there is not a Protestant or Catholic or Jewish account-
ancy. Being a homosexual is, they will say, as irrelevant to playing the
organ as it is to balancing books or mopping floors.
II. SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAWS AND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS:
THE CASE OF GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
If Iowa enacts a sexual orientation statute, it must expect results that
are similar to those in other jurisdictions that have sexual orientation
laws. A recent decision in the District of Columbia should give Iowa
pause.
In the spring of 1988, Georgetown University concluded litigation
that had dragged on for eight years with two homosexual student organi-
zations.48 Georgetown claimed victory but had to pay its opponents' attor-
ney's fees, which reportedly totaled more than $640,000.48 Georgetown's
own legal fees were probably more than $640,000. Not many religious in-
stitutions can afford "victories" where the attorney's fees alone run to
some $1.5 million, and fewer can afford "victories" at the expense of their
moral tenets. Georgetown's tenets were toppled by a sexual orientation
ordinance that trumped the first amendment.
A. The District of Columbia Ordinance
In 1977, the District of Columbia enacted a Human Rights Act that,
among other things, made it unlawful for "an educational institution [to]
deny, restrict, or to abridge or condition the use of, or access to, any of its
facilities and services to any person otherwise qualified, wholly or par-
tially, for a discriminatory reason, based upon the ... sexual orientation.
. of any individual."5 0 "'Sexual orientation' means male or female homo-
sexuality, heterosexuality and bisexuality, by preference or practice." 1
Similar to the Iowa bill, the District of Columbia Act contains an
exception for certain religious activities, which reads in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in the provisions of this chapter shall be construed to
' See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
4 See Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Center v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d
1 (D.C. 1987) (en banc).
" Since winners do not ordinarily pay attorney's fees for losers it is difficult to credit Ge-
orgetown with a win.
60 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2520 (1981).
5- Id. § 1-2502(28).
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bar any religious or political organization, or any organization operated for
charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or con-
trolled by or in connection with a religious or political organization, from
limiting employment, or sales, or rental of housing accommodations, or ad-
mission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or political
persuasion as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious or
political principles for which it is established or maintained."'
In November 1987, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals con-
strued the District of Columbia Human Rights Act to mean that a univer-
sity that has "invariably defined itself as a Roman Catholic institution"
cannot lawfully deny funds, services, or facilities to homosexual student
groups even though the Roman Catholic Church regards homosexual acts
as sinful and Georgetown University regarded the activities of the student
groups as inappropriate for a Catholic institution.53
B. Georgetown's System for Recognizing Student Groups
Before the Gay Rights Coalition complaint was filed, the homosexual
student groups already had Georgetown's "Student Body Endorse-
ment"-a status that issues from the student senate and allows a group
to "(a) use University facilities; (b) apply for lecture fund privileges; (c)
receive financial counseling from the comptroller; (d) use campus adver-
tising; and (e) petition to receive assistance from Student Government." 4
But the homosexual student groups were not satisfied with "Student
Body Endorsement." They wanted what Georgetown calls "University
Recognition," which entitles a group to four additional benefits, viz., to
"(f) use a mailbox in the [Student Activities Commission] office and re-
quest one in Hoya station; (g) use the Computer Label Service; (h) use
mailing services: and (i) apply for funding."5 5 On religious grounds Ge-
orgetown refused to give "University Recognition."
In court, the homosexual student groups were joined by some dozen
advocacy groups, including the Women's Legal Defense Fund, the Center
for Constitutional Rights, Equal Rights Advocates, Lesbian Rights Pro-
ject, National Women's Political Caucus, American Civil Liberties Union,
12 Id. § 1-2503(b).
53 See Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Center v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d
1, 17 (D.C. 1987) (en banc). This case is reviewed in Dutile, God and Gays at Georgetown;
Observations on Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Center v. Georgetown
Univ., 15 J. COLL & UNiV. L. 1 (1988); Note, The Collision of Religious Exercise and Gov-
ernmental Nondiscrimination Policies, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1227-28 (1989); and Com-
ment, supra note 38.
0' Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 10.
55 Id.
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and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund.68 Also joining the stu-
dent groups were the Governor's Council on Lesbian and Gay Issues of
the State of Wisconsin 57 and the City of Seattle, Washington. Amici are
cited here to demonstrate what certain influential civil rights and homo-
sexual rights advocacy groups believe a statute means. I have yet to find a
case where one of these groups sided with the religious institution and
said, "No, the sexual orientation statute doesn't go that far." Addition-
ally, the District of Columbia intervened on the students' behalf.
C. Georgetown as a Religious School
Since its founding in 1789, Georgetown has been a Catholic univer-
sity, and all of its presidents have been Roman Catholic clergymen. Its
undergraduate bulletin says, "Georgetown is committed to a view of real-
ity which reflects Catholic and Jesuit influences .... As an institution
that is Catholic, Georgetown believes that all men are sons of God, called
to a life of oneness with Him now and in eternity." 58
The Catholic Church teaches that homosexual activity is sinful. The
following statements taken from the court's opinion express the position
of the University and the Roman Catholic Church on the questions of
homosexuality and recognizing the homosexual student groups.
Father Timothy S. Healy, the President of Georgetown University,
said that based upon his understanding of the student groups:
[T]he University's official recognition and endorsement of these organiza-
tions would be contrary to and in conflict with the traditional and consis-
tent teachings of the Roman Catholic Church on the question of human
sexuality. Organizations such as those at issue, which are based on a view of
human nature which emphasizes the sexual aspects of human nature as
dominant to the exclusion of other values, and which encourage and foster
homosexuality, are totally incompatible with the teachings of the Roman
Catholic Church on human sexuality, teachings which are central to the be-
liefs of Roman Catholics.
5 9
Reverend Richard J. McCormick, S.J., Georgetown's theological ex-
pert, said that a Roman Catholic university
" Id. at 3-4.
51 Id. at 4. Wisconsin has a state-wide prohibition on discrimination with respect to sexual
orientation. " 'Sexual orientation' means having any preference for heterosexuality, homo-
sexuality or bisexuality, having a history of such a preference or being identified with such a
preference." Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 111.32 (13)(m) (West 1981). In the four years following the
enactment of the law, there were some 150 complaints of sexual orientation discrimination
filed with the State's Human Rights Commission. See Legality, Psychology and the Homo-
sexual Rights Bill, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1986, at E6, col.1.
" Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 6.
" Id. at 64.
33 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 2
"has a duty to act in a way consistent with [Catholic] teachings and not to
undermine them in its public policies. . . ." Thus, "in its public policies
and public acts," the University "ought not to adopt a public policy of ex-
plicit endorsement or implicit endorsement" of, for example, abortion, pre-
marital intercourse, or homosexual conduct. Georgetown should not "in its
public actions, policies, decisions, take a position that would equivalently
establish another normative lifestyle [as] equally valid with the one that is
[taught by the Church]."
Georgetown combines the religious and the secular, and both ele-
ments were considered at length by the court. Notwithstanding this dual-
ity, the University was held to be sufficiently religious to claim the pro-
tection of the First Amendment. The court said it "accept[ed] that the
threat of enforcement of the Human Rights Act with regard to the tangi-
ble benefits imposes a burden on Georgetown's religious practice suffi-
cient for it to invoke the Free Exercise Clause."61 Even so, the court
found that the District of Columbia Council had a compelling interest in
eliminating discrimination based on sexual preference which superseded
and overrode the University's right to free exercise of religion.2
D. The Georgetown Opinion
The court did not order Georgetown to grant formal "University Rec-
ognition" to the homosexual student groups but did order the University
to give the groups all the tangible benefits and services to which they
would be entitled if they had such formal recognition. 3 (The phrase "a
distinction without a difference" has never been more applicable than
here.) The Court summarized its opinion in this way:
The Human Rights Act does not require a grant of "University Recogni-
tion" because, in the particular scheme at Georgetown University, that sta-
tus includes a religiously based on "endorsement" of the recipient student
group. But the Human Rights Act does demand that Georgetown make its
"facilities and services" equally available without regard to sexual orienta-
tion. Those "facilities and services" include the tangible benefits that come
with "University Recognition." Georgetown denied tangible benefits on the
basis of sexual orientation and in so doing violated the Human Rights Act.
The University's [First Amendment] free exercise defense does not exempt
it from compliance with the statute, because the District of Columbia's
compelling interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination out-
weighs any burden that equal provision of the tangible benefits would im-
60 Id. at 19.
61 Id. at 31.
61 Id. at 33.
63 Id. at 39.
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pose on Georgetown's religious exercise."
All seven judges of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals wrote
opinions. For our purposes, there were two major questions: Must Ge-
orgetown grant full "University Recognition" status to homosexual
groups? And, if the answer to the first question is "no, '"" must the Uni-
versity nevertheless grant all tangible benefits associated with "University
Recognition"? Judges Ferren and Terry answered the first question
"yes."6 Judges Belson and Nebeker answered both questions "no. 6 7
Judges Pryor, Mack and Newman answered the first question "no" and
the second question "yes." Therefore, one majority (Pryor, Mack, New-
man, Belson, and Nebeker) answered the first question "no" and held the
University did not have to grant full "University Recognition," but an-
other majority (Pryor, Mack, Newman, Ferren, and Terry) answered the
second question "yes" and held that the University did have to grant all
tangible benefits that "University Recognition" entails. The two votes
were 5-to-2, but those votes mask the fact that on the rationale the court
was split 2-3-2. It is not possible to more cleanly divide a seven member
court.
Georgetown came within two votes of having to grant full, formal
"University Recognition" to campus homosexual groups. Then again, it
also came within two votes of winning totally on first amendment
grounds. As it is, Georgetown has to extend all privileges of "University
Recognition" without actually attaching the imprimatur.
Many champions of religious liberty regarded the Georgetown deci-
sion as tragically wrong, and in 1988 Congress ordered the District of Co-
lumbia City Council to amend the statute to protect religiously affiliated
institutions.6 However, for reasons that are unrelated to the issues ad-
6' Id. (emphasis added)
5 For those who answer "yes" to the first question, the second is answered automatically in
the affirmative.
" See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 46-47 (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). "Georgetown University may not lawfully refuse to accord the plaintiff gay rights
groups 'University [Riecognition,' which means (1) status equal to that of the other student
groups formally recognized by the university, including permission to use the university
name, and (2) the tangible benefits uniformly available to other recognized groups." Id.
(Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7 Id. at 67 (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Even if there were a
valid finding that Georgetown had violated the Human Rights Act, Georgetown should pre-
vail in this litigation on the basis of its constitutional rights under the free speech and free
exercise clauses of the first amendment." Id. (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
" See Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, § 145 of the District
of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. 100-462, 102 Stat. 2269-14 (1988). The Reli-
gious Liberty Act was subsequently held unconstitutional. See infra note 69 and accompa-
nying text.
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dressed here, a federal district court stayed Congress's order.69 In 1989,
Congress took matters into its own hands and changed the law itself.70
The Georgetown decision teaches two vital lessons. First, a "sexual
orientation" statute, even one that has a statutory exemption for religious
organizations, can be used to command a church-affiliated school to pro-
vide benefits to homosexual groups even when the school raises bona fide
religious objections. Neither the statutory exemption nor the Constitution
will protect the school. Second, less obvious but perhaps more important,
a "sexual orientation" statute transfers to the judiciary the duty to review
a religious institution's policies on human sexuality-and even the most
conscientiously drafted statute cannot eliminate judicial surprises.
After Georgetown, Iowans cannot assume that the first amendment
will protect religious institutions from the commands, express or implied,
of a sexual orientation statute. Georgetown demonstrates how a sexual
orientation statute can adversely affect the programs and activities of a
religious school-and "programs and activities" means everything from
the senior prom71 to campus newspaper advertisements7 2 to military
recruiting.7"
President Reagan wrote the following to Senator William L. Armstrong, the chief spon-
sor of the Religious Liberty Act: "Your defense of religious liberty through your amendment
to the D.C. Appropriations bill was admirable. It is intolerable that any jurisdiction in this
country would force church-related institutions and religious schools to contravene their
own religious tenets. I applaud your leadership in defending not just religious institutions
within the District of Columbia but the freedom of religion throughout the country." Letter
from President Ronald W. Reagan to William L. Armstrong (Jul. 15, 1988).
69 See Clarke v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 605, 613 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 404
(D.C. Cir. 1989). The government's suggestion of mootness and motion to vacate will be
considered by the District of Columbia Circuit sitting en banc. Clarke v. United States, No.
88-5439 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 1989) (order that motion be considered en banc).
,0 See Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, § 141 of the District
of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1990, Pub. L. 101-168, 103 Stat. 1284 (1989). Congress has
"exclusive" legislative power over the District of Columbia. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
71 See Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381, 388 (D.R.I. 1980) (public school ordered to allow
male high school senior to bring male date to high school prom), vacated and remanded
with directions to dismiss for mootness, 627 F.2d 1088 (1st Cir. 1980).
7 See Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 638 F. Supp. 143, 150 (D. Neb. 1986) (state university
newspaper's right to refuse to publish sexual orientation in classified advertisements upheld
on first amendment grounds), aff'd, 829 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1987). But suppose after enact-
ment of H.F. 351 a religiously affiliated school in Iowa refused to allow its bulletin boards to
be used for posting of notices that begin, "gay roommate wanted"?
71 See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 86 (3d Cir. 1986). Because the
Armed Services of the United States do not recruit homosexuals, the City of Philadelphia
Commission on Human Rights ordered Temple University to stop allowing military
recruiters on its campus. See id. Holding that federal law preempted the City ordinance, the
third circuit told the commission to withdraw its order. See id. The case shows that a
school's program or activity can include allowing a third party to use a campus if the third
party discriminates with respect to sexual orientation.
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III. CONCLUSION
A few years ago, the Catholic Diocese of New York, the Salvation
Army, and Agudath Israel, which provide New York City with such things
as shelters for the homeless, the abused, and the wayward, fought the
City over the Mayor's executive order requiring city contractors to certify
that they do not discriminate with respect to sexual orientation. 4
The State's highest court did not reach the sexual orientation issue
but held that the mayor had exceeded his executive authority."s The in-
termediate appellate court did reach the merits of the sexual orientation
issue, however, and upheld the executive order. The Appellate Division's
approach demonstrated how a court can discount a church's moral
requirements:
Where sexual proclivity does not relate to job function, it seems clearly un-
constitutional to penalize an individual in one of the most imperative of
life's endeavors, the right to earn one's daily bread.
Executive Order 50 does not prohibit the exercise of religious belief.
This Order does not attempt to infringe on the right of any religious organi-
zation to maintain its religious tenets. Nor is it a restriction on a private
group using its own funds for its own purposes. However, when any organi-
zation contracts to perform secular services for the City, the Mayor has the
power and the authority, and the constitutional obligation, to require non-
7 See Under 21 v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 353-54, 482 N.E.2d 1, 3, 492 N.Y.S.2d
522, 524 (1985). Writing of his refusal to comply with the Mayor's executive order, John
Cardinal O'Connor stated:
From the outset, I tried to make it clear that we were not knowingly excluding any-
one from employment because of homosexual orientation. I repeatedly stated that we
would be willing to consider for employment even an individual who had actively
engaged in homosexual behavior in the past, and who might, through human weak-
ness, do so again in the future. As long as such an individual was sincerely trying to
be chaste, we would willingly consider employment. The "rules" would be the same
for those who, unmarried, have engaged in or might in the future engage in, what we
would consider to be illicit heterosexual relations. We are profoundly aware of human
weakness, and it may well be that we already employ people who have slipped
homosexually or heterosexually. We engage in no witch hunts. All of which is quite
different from recruiting the homosexually oriented or being told by the city that we
must employ them. That, I believe, is "excessive entanglement" in Church affairs on
the part of the State. I was adamant. We would not, we could not, yield our right to
employ individuals ready, willing and able to support the Church's values in provid-
ing child care.
J. O'CONNOR & E. KOCH, His EMINENCE AND HIZZONER 120 (1989) (footnote omitted).
7' See Under 21, 65 N.Y.2d at 364, 482 N.E.2d at 10, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 531. Later, the City
Council passed a "Gay Rights Law" and the Mayor issued a revised order on authority of
the new law. New York City, N.Y. ADMIN CODE § 8-108.1 (1986). The law contains a religious
exemption. Id. § 8-108.1(2)(c). The city and the churches continue to disagree over the law's
meaning. See J. O'CONNOR & E. KOCH, supra note 74, at 103.
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discriminatory hiring policies based exclusively upon fitness for job
performance.76
Of course, religious institutions may believe (and some in fact do be-
lieve) that there are moral components or moral requirements for all jobs
within their churches and affiliated organizations. In the view of these
institutions, there are no jobs-no matter how lowly, no matter how dis-
tant from the altar-"where sexual proclivity does not relate to job
function."
Consider this example: Under a sexual orientation statute, may a re-
ligiously-affiliated boys' home which houses, counsels, and educates
troubled boys require its employees to adhere to the following pledge?
I understand that my duties and responsibilities include providing proper
training, example, and image to boys under my supervision. Since homosex-
ual activity or orientation is contrary to the generally recognized and ac-
cepted standards of morality and the standards of the church that sponsors
this boys' home, I understand that if I engage in any homosexual activity or
if I have a homosexual orientation that such activity or orientation will be
considered to have a substantially adverse effect on the performance of my
duties and be grounds for my dismissal."
Religious organizations wish to preserve their right and prerogative
to say where "sexual proclivity" does or does not "relate to job function"
within their own organizations. A sexual orientation act transfers that
prerogative to administrative officers, lawyers, and judges. The question
then is whether the statutory exemption or constitutional guarantee is
large enough to encompass those rights and prerogatives which the reli-
gious organizations claim and which properly belong to them.
In commenting on the New York City dispute, Michael Novak wrote:
The real issue is whether the state may exact a moral pledge from a
church or other free association. If the state may do so on a clearly moral
issue such as sexual "preferences and practices," on what moral matters
would its powers be ruled excessive?
Moreover, moral "preferences" do not so easily lie down side by side,
lion with lamb, as extreme versions of moral relativism imagine. Moral vi-
sions clash, one denying what the other affirms, one finding evil what the
other finds good. A declaration that citizens cannot discriminate among
moral "preferences" would be self-contradictory. Nondiscrimination itself is
a moral "preference." Moral relativism is not open to civilized people.
Pluralism requires that each player-the church, too-have its own in-
tegrity. It is not for the state to tell the church what to hold moral or how to
76 Under 21 v. City of New York, 108 App. Div. 2d 250, 252, 488 N.Y.S. 2d 669, 671 (1st
Dep't 1985), modified, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 482 N.E.2d 1, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1985).
"' This hypothetical pledge is derived from the findings in Safransky v. State Personnel Bd.,
62 Wisc.2d 464, 468, 215 N.W.2d 379, 382-83 (1974).
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conduct itself morally. The state must uphold its own laws-but, in the area
of moral choice, very carefully. 8
This article has reviewed four principal cases where homosexuals
brought suit against religious organizations: In Georgetown, the church-
affiliated university lost (but claimed victory); in Christian Science Moni-
tor, the church-affiliated newspaper lost in part; in Father Buchanan and
Presbyterian Organist the churches won. But the simpler truth is that in
each of these cases the churches lost by reason of having to face their
accusers in judicial forums.
When Father Buchanan survived a motion that he be ordered to hire
a homosexual in his church school, it wasn't a victory, just Catholic en-
durance coupled with a sigh of relief. When the First Orthodox Presbyte-
rian Church of San Francisco was told it did not have to keep a homosex-
ual at the organ, that wasn't a victory, but Presbyterian perseverance
joined with thanksgiving. No church can litigate over homosexuality and
be victorious. The church loses when it walks into the courthouse to sub-
mit its moral authority on sexual matters to the oversight of a civil magis-
trate. After the hearing or trial, if the church should "win," it gains only a
verdict, not a victory.
It is not true that everyone wins when "civil rights" bills are enacted.
Churches, and the moral authority that they shoulder and the sexual re-
straint that they preach, will be big losers under sexual orientation
statutes.
78 Novak, Church, State, and the Times, 37 NAT'L REV. 46 (Feb. 8, 1985). As one commenta-
tor has explained:
Democratic government is limited government. It is limited in the claims it makes
and in the power it seeks to exercise. Democratic government understands itself to be
accountable to values and to truth which transcend any regime or party. ...
[L]imited government means that a clear distinction is made between the state and
the society. The state is not the whole of the society, but is one important actor in the
society. Other institutions-notably the family, the Church, educational, economic
and cultural enterprises-are at least equally important actors in the society. They do
not exist or act by sufferance of the state. Rather, these spheres have their own pecu-
liar sovereignty which must be respected by the state.
R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 90 (1984) (quoting Neuhaus, Christianity and De-
mocracy, a statement of purpose adopted by the Institute on Religion and Democracy,
Wash. D.C.).

